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Inderjeet Parmar (University of Manchester, UK): “American Power and Identities in 
the Age of Obama" 
Most of the articles in this special issue of International Politics stem from a 
Symposium at the University of Manchester, in summer 2009, just a few short months 
after the inauguration of the Unites States’ first African-American head of state, 
President Barack Hussein Obama. His election, in the wake of the deeply unpopular 
presidency of George W. Bush – which brought ‘anti-Americanism’ to new highs 
across the world1 – was truly historic. As The Economist noted, “When they voted to 
send a black man to the White House at the end of 2008, Americans performed one of 
the most remarkable acts of rebranding in the history of their remarkable nation”.2 An 
African-American in the truest (immigrant-not-descended-from-slaves) sense of the 
word was elected president – born to a white American mother, and a Kenyan father, 
with Islamic family roots. Further, Obama had spent a significant part of his 
childhood on Hawaii, not to mention Indonesia. In his profoundly engaging Dreams 
From My Father, Obama more than hints at an understanding of the workings of neo-
colonial power in ‘post-colonial’ Africa.3 Elected on a massive tide of discontent 
about America’s role in the world and its own sense of worth, occasioned by the 
travails of Bush’s global war on terror and horrific tales of systematic torture and 
kidnapping of terror suspects, held without charge, trial or the protections of the US 
constitution, Obama was the ‘new face’ of American power, one that would steer 
America away from imperialistic hubris and war towards reconciliation, consultation 
and understanding: America under Obama would, once again, be a force for good in 
the world, and a power that would heal a divided society.  
But what does Obama’s elevation to the White House really signify? What does it 
mean for the nature of American society, its racialised system of inequality, its 
political order, its very self-concepts and identities? While the election of Obama 
certainly represents an historic change (whoever predicted that a black man would 
enter the White House as commander-in-chief?) less than 50 years after the passage of 
the Voting Rights Act that guaranteed the franchise to African-Americans in the ‘Jim 
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Crow’ deep south of racial segregation, The Economist’s reference to “rebranding” 
points up ambiguities about the depth of the change Obama actually represents in 
regard to fundamental transformational politics. Obama is reputed to have said 
somewhere, in response to a question about whether he really was “the change 
candidate”, “I am the change”.4  In its own way, this raises the issue of agency and 
structure in politics. How much change could be expected of a president inheriting 
two major foreign wars, encompassed by the ‘war on terror’ or ‘the long war’, a 
global financial-economic crisis, and international and domestic crises of confidence? 
And how would he cope with long-term structural factors over which no president 
could expect to exercise significant influence let alone control. Such structural factors 
are advanced and substantiated in some detail by the first three articles in this issue – 
Trubowitz and Mellow, and McCormack, and Halperin. Given such factors, and a 
legacy of wars and financial crisis, how much room for manoeuvre did/does Obama 
actually possess? In other words, given the context, what difference could Obama 
make? Whatever the answers to these questions might be in hard political terms, the 
fact remains that his campaign – in the context of a deeply unpopular and, indeed in 
some quarters, hated, Bush administration – implied a promise of political 
transformation. Its slogans, “Change We Can Believe In” and “Yes We Can”, heavily 
indicated that Obama would break from the Bush administration, particularly in 
foreign and national security affairs.  
President Obama's 2010 National Security Strategy, however, strongly echoes that of 
his predecessor, George W. Bush, and is also almost identical to that suggested by a 
large group of elite academics, military officials, businessmen, and former Clinton 
administration insiders brought together as the Princeton Project on National Security 
(PPNS) back in 2004-2006. The Princeton Project was led by Princeton academics 
Anne-Marie Slaughter and G. John Ikenberry, featured Reagan's secretary of state, 
George Schultz, and Clinton's national security adviser, Anthony Lake, as co-chairs. 
Francis Fukuyama, erstwhile neo-con, sat on the steering committee and was co-
author of the Project's working paper on grand strategy. Henry Kissinger acted as 
adviser, as did Harvard's Joseph Nye, author of the concept of “Soft Power”, 
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morphing more recently into “Smart Power”.5 PPNS represented a new cross-party 
consensus on how to 'correct' the excesses and reckless enthusiasm for American 
power of the Bush administration.6 
 
Several PPNS participants and leaders were appointed to the Obama administration: 
Jim Steinberg to the state department, Michael McFaul and Samantha Power to the 
national security council, for example. Anne-Marie Slaughter heads up the state 
department's policy planning staff - the department's in-house think tank, the first 
director of which was Princeton's George F. Kennan, author of the concept that 
defined US policy in the cold war era: containment. PPNS was a self-conscious 
attempt to replicate Kennan's work and impact in the post-Bush era, in the wake of the 
'war of choice' (then supported by numerous current Obama administration members) 
against Iraq.7 Other appointees, including Jim Jones as national security adviser, John 
Brennan to head of counter-terrorism, and Robert Gates (retained as secretary of 
defense from the Bush administration), further suggest that Obama chose to retain 
strong elements of the Bush foreign policy programme. 
 
The similarities of Obama's 2010 National Security Strategy to those of Bush and 
Princeton suggests that it is/will be 'business as usual', in the main. The principal lines 
of US global behaviour – in Iraq, Afghanistan, Iran, Israel - remain the same, with 
tactical and stylistic differences. Undoubtedly, Obama's rhetoric is less bellicose and 
less inflammatory than Bush's, but that softening of tone was beginning in the final 
months of the previous administration in any case. The military surge in Afghanistan, 
the identification of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border as the focus of the war on terror, 
the military 'draw-down' in Iraq, the “military surge” concept combining lethal 
military power and restoration of public services, were also processes begun under 
Bush. The attempts to close Guantanamo began under Bush, and continue, without 
success, today.8 
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But Obama continues to back ‘rendition’ (kidnapping terror suspects), and is actively 
trying to prevent the extension of constitutional protections to inmates at Bagram and 
other lawless prisons holding uncharged terror suspects.9 He may be accused by some 
of declaring war on Israel,10 but one would hardly know it from his total silence on 
Israel's war on Gaza or its recent illegal attack on a ship carrying aid for Israel's 
million-and-a-half victims in Gaza, not to mention the billions of dollars of US 
military and other aid to Israel.11 
 
Obama's mission - US leadership, military superiority, global reach, shaping the 
international order, making and enforcing global rules, spreading freedom and 
democracy, lauding postwar international institution-building under President Harry 
Truman (the golden age to both Bush and Obama, and PPNS’ Ikenberry and 
Slaughter) - is of a piece with all post-1945 American administrations. The rhetoric 
and tactics vary with conditions within the US and in the world at large but the goals 
remain the same. 
 
At this point in time, the US is suffering from military overstretch and economic 
crisis: it struggles physically to fight, and financially to afford, two wars (even after 
ending the combat mission in Iraq at the end of August, 2010) at the levels of 
intensity required, and remains committed to a professional military rather than a 
conscripted one (which proved problematic during the Vietnam War).12 At home, 
there are rumblings about America's internal problems of unemployment and other 
social issues, as well as increasing scepticism about the nature and costs - financial 
and moral - of America's global interventionism. Hence, Obama has adopted a policy 
similar to Prime Minister David Cameron's 'big society': building alliances with non-
governmental groups, think tanks, and foundations better to intervene in world affairs, 
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especially in the governance of other societies designated as threats or potential 
threats to America's 'security'.13 
 
While the above arguments might make the prospects for ‘root and branch’ change 
seem distant, even relatively minor changes may have significant effects in 
international politics. Zbigniew Brzezinski, who was crucial to the identification of 
Jimmy Carter as a candidate for the White House in the wake of the Vietnam War and 
the Watergate scandal in the mid-1970s,14 similarly isolated Obama as the man to 
restore America’s battered moral authority in world affairs in the post-Bush era.15 
And it is difficult to argue that Obama’s election did not dent world-wide anti-
Americanism.16 The securing of the Nobel Peace Prize in 2009 was precisely for the 
anticipated impact of Obama on the ‘atmospherics’, the tone, of American foreign 
policy and world politics – with its rhetorical emphasis on listening to, consulting and 
cooperating with other nations and multilateral organisations. But what deep effects 
do such ‘minor’ changes inaugurate? How long does the ‘feel good’ factor last in the 
absence of substantive policy change?  The impacts of insubstantial changes are 
usually temporary: the Muslim world never fully bought the Obama story;17 and 
Europeans are beginning to learn that Obama is no ‘soft touch’ as he presses them to 
send more troops to Afghanistan and be ready financially and otherwise to support 
principles for which they claim to stand.18 
 
The articles below consider these and other issues of change and continuity from a 
variety of angles and through examining a range of themes. A key aim is to increase 
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our understanding of how racial, religious and imperial factors have helped to shape 
American identities and power, and to begin a discussion of the ways in which those 
factors combine and impact on American power and identities in the Obama era. 
Leading scholars from the US, Europe and Britain examine the ways in which race, 
religion and empire intertwine and help constitute US power. However, race, religion, 
and empire’s symbiotic relationship constitutes a deep structure and process rooted in 
US history. This issue of International Politics interrogates the ways in which 
historical structures, agencies and processes have changed, or mutated, and how they 
might further transform under President Barack Obama.  
Before exploring these ideational themes, however, three articles argue that long-term 
structural factors at work within American society, economy and polity, severely limit 
the degree of change that Obama can effectively bring about. Peter Trubowitz and 
Nicole Mellow argue that the bi-partisan aspirations of Obama are extremely unlikely 
to come to fruition in terms of a political consensus on foreign and national security 
policy, despite broad acceptance of the salience of the “terrorist threat” since 9-11. 
This is because bipartisanship results not only from a shared perception of an external 
threat but also a strong domestic economy and regionally-diverse party coalitions, 
conditions that prevailed during the cold war but patently do not today. Tara 
McCormack, on the other hand, argues that Obama must cope with the fundamental 
fact that US hegemony in Europe was predicated on Europe’s relative domestic 
weaknesses after the Second World War, a condition more or less eliminated today. 
The Soviet ‘threat’ had clearly played a key role in cementing US hegemony but of 
even greater salience had been European post-war domestic vulnerability and 
insecurity. That no longer being the case, Europe is more assertive and less likely to 
yield to US pressure – for greater levels of economic and financial stimulus, for 
example, or for greater troop commitments to America’s wars, including the long-
running war in Afghanistan.  
From a political economy perspective, Sandra Halperin’s article, is continuous with, 
but adds to, the themes considered above. In particular, Halperin considers the Anglo-
American basis of the pursuit of economic resources. Halperin argues that “the 
invasion of Iraq can best be understood as part of the latest phase of Anglo-American 
global re-structuring; and that it has much to tell us about the political economy of 
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Anglo-American power.” Rather than instituting radical change, Barack Obama’s 
administration inherited and is actively developing a strategy that harks back to the 
nineteenth-century of Pax Britannica. In addition, then, to the lack of hegemony-
producing domestic economic and political conditions within the US and Europe, 
Halperin argues that the political economy of Anglo-American power severely 
constrains the possibilities of change that Obama could inaugurate.     
The rest of the articles in this special issue focus on ideational processes that tend to 
produce strong tendencies towards continuity, further eroding the possibilities of a 
‘change presidency’.  Tony Smith’s essay on President Woodrow Wilson’s strategic 
role in secularising biological racism into cultural superiority and evangelical zeal 
into a sense of national mission helps understand the continuing significance of social 
Darwinism in American life, the generalised power of deeply-held convictions no 
longer palatable to the majority of Americans let alone world opinion. As Smith 
argues, through Woodrow Wilson’s “democratizing ambitions, what formerly had 
been racial and religious beliefs became secular and modern convictions that gave to 
American foreign policy a self-confident and self-righteous identity capable of 
undertaking acts of progressive imperialism….” Smith’s view is that these deep-
seated convictions – that imperial creed19 – blossomed after the Cold War’s end in the 
presidencies of Bill Clinton, George W. Bush and of Barack Obama. 
Other articles in this issue pick up on and explore in depth several of Smith’s themes. 
Heavily implied therein is the inextricably-linked character of America’s domestic 
ethno-racial-cultural and political identities and its foreign and national security 
policies. While practically all scholars of international politics pay lip service to this, 
this approach is fully exemplified in analysing the character of American power in the 
Obama era in this special issue. Srdjan Vucetic’s contribution, for example, explores 
the ways in which the Obama presidency negotiates, critiques and reproduces the 
racial, religious, linguistic and economic-institutional sources of American imperial 
identities. His argument is that, despite Obama’s racial minority origins, there are 
deeper impulses of a secularised racial-religious order that continue to exert 
substantial influence in American life, politics and, therefore, foreign relations. 
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In an historically-informed inter-disciplinary article, Mark Ledwidge shows the 
numerous consequences of the rise of Barack Obama to the presidency, including the 
conservative attempts to link Obama to ‘Islamic fundamentalism’ and black 
‘extremism’, the latter through a brief foray into the Jeremiah Wright affair. Ledwidge 
suggests that “mainstream responses to Obama were couched in coded, neo-racial 
language aligned with a conservative agenda pertaining to domestic and foreign 
affairs.” Going even further, Ledwidge argues that “the controversy concerning 
Obama’s religious identity and alleged radicalism were tactical ploys aimed at 
questioning the wisdom of electing a candidate with non-WASP [White Anglo-Saxon 
Protestant] credentials.” Obama was portrayed by many – especially on the political 
Right – as the ultimate ‘outsider’, the ‘un-American’ whose loyalties were suspect. 
Claims that the election of Obama marked the dawn of a ‘post-racial’ phase in US 
politics and foreign policy are placed under a microscope and found wanting. Indeed, 
there are echoes in the rhetoric of post-racial politics of President Ronald Reagan’s 
‘color-blind’ approach to race, society and politics which, in the context of deep-
seated racial inequalities merely served to increase the inter- and intra-racial 
polarisation of ‘life chances’.20 Placing Obama in the context of a complex of 
historical, racial and international factors, Ledwidge argues that Obama permits 
America to present to the world a new, more cosmopolitan face – as the United States 
moves ever closer to transforming into a ‘minority-majority’ nation.  
Kevern Verney, in an article that closely complements Ledwidge’s analysis, explores 
Obama’s victory in November 2008 in the context of previous African-American 
political campaigns, including Jesse Jackson’s. Why did Obama win when others had 
failed? Verney is persuaded that Obama won because he is an exceptional candidate 
in exceptional times. That is, as Obama pollster, Cornell Belcher, noted, without such 
exceptional circumstances and personal qualities, a black American would find it 
impossible to win election to the White House.21 This explains why Obama’s victory 
was not, in comparative electoral terms, by a landslide. While racial factors may well 
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have diminished in American life, Obama’s election neither reflected nor called into 
being an era of post-racial politics in America. 
Lee Marsden, examining the inter-connections between race, religion and notions of 
American ‘exceptionalism’ argues that Obama’s foreign policy is influenced by his 
Christian faith and a prevailing discourse of American identity which is determined 
by foundational myths and civil religion that has significant elements of continuity 
with previous administrations, including that of George W. Bush. The article, which 
investigates the work of American religious missionaries, among other things, revisits 
notions of manifest destiny, ‘innocent nation’ and civil religion, arguing they have 
been, and are, instrumental in constructing an American identity capable of unifying 
disparate American nations domestically while promoting US power abroad.  
“Promoting God and capitalism”, Marsden argues, influence and constrain Obama’s 
foreign policy.  “US hegemony under Bush and Obama,” Marsden concludes, is “non 
negotiable and although presentational style differs the prevailing orthodoxy, 
underpinned by civil religion and foundational myths, remains unchanged”. 
 
Stuart Croft’s article on American religious identities suggests that there is greater 
flux and change underway that open up the possibilities of alterations in America’s 
overseas behaviours. Croft considers the issue through detailed analysis of two 
specific communities, one identified principally as ‘racial’, the other as ‘religious’ – 
First Peoples (Native Americans) and Asian-Americans, respectively. Racially-
identified people are suspect while faith-based communities are ‘acceptable’ to the 
American family – the boundaries of which are world-wide. Croft concludes that 
“forms of faith are still embedded in notions of national identity, to be explored, 
valued, and expanded as appropriate…. And in this mutual constitution, the American 
can be found globally; by sharing the values of the evangelical, anyone can be part of 
this newly developing community, whether they hail from Argentina, Austria or 
Afghanistan.” Evangelising Americans show that “The hard and fast boundary at the 
edges of the United States no longer acts as a barrier to identity construction and 
reconstruction (if it ever really did). Evangelicalism in the United States is making 
new Americans on a local basis, and is finding them on a global basis,” Croft 
concludes. 
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Croft’s findings, as well as those of Marsden, Ledwidge and Smith add ballast to 
Richard Jackson’s and Mike Boyle’s and Maria Ryan’s contributions to the ways in 
which Obama’s national security policies continue on essentially the same lines as 
those of his Republican predecessor in the White House. According to Jackson, 
Obama’s underlying message of change to the Middle Eastern world is embedded in 
the same cultural grammar of ‘exceptionalism’ as deployed by Bush. Obama’s 
‘failure’ to use the crises in Iraq, Afghanistan and the global economy to institute 
‘crisis-driven’ policy change, Jackson argues, indicates he “is not a norm entrepreneur 
but rather an agent of the US foreign policy consensus.” Jackson further adds that the 
war on terror has developed bureaucratic power, political salience and popular-
cultural authority. Needless to say, it will not last forever, but its institutional 
embeddedness and rhetorical utility suggests the war on terror is set to last for some 
time. Complementarily, Boyle argues that the framing of the responses to 9-11 as 
between “freedom and fear”, the hardening of the pre-existing consensus between 
neo-conservatives and liberal internationalists on democracy promotion, and an 
increasingly influential ‘democracy bureaucracy’, combine to ensure significant 
continuity between the Bush and Obama presidencies. Maria Ryan’s contribution 
breaks new ground in more thoroughly exploring the global war on terror “in 
countries we are not at war with,” as the Pentagon Quadrennial Review of 2006 noted. 
Ryan’s article considers the war on terror waged by US Special Forces in the 
Philippines, in Georgia and the Caspian area, and the Horn and Saharan Africa. 
Rather than challenging the Bush administration’s definition of the character of the 
“terrorist threat”, Ryan argues, President Obama has embraced it in all but name. 
Writing before the release of secret US embassy cables by the Wikileaks organisation, 
which confirmed that Obama was continuing if not escalating operations in countries 
such as Yemen and Somalia,22 Ryan accurately concludes that “Obama’s record so far 
demonstrates that intervention… is ongoing… and its continuation seems certain.” 
Indeed, the Obama administration budgeted US$300 million to anti-terrorism and 
other military operations across Africa.  
Giles Scott-Smith and Moritz Baumgartel interrogate the Obama administration’s 
ideas of “network power”, as exemplified by the work of its director of policy 
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planning, Anne-Marie Slaughter. Slaughter claims that network-power is the new 
twenty-first reality in world politics, and that the United States is the most networked-
nation, giving it a natural advantage in extending and consolidating its power. Part of 
its networks derive from its immigrant communities that retain strong links with the 
‘Old Country’. The world is open to American influence through new network 
formations of non-governmental, inter-governmental, and international associations 
for addressing global concerns – failed states, health pandemics, climate change - 
constituting US-led ‘global governance’, based on the universalisation of US values. 
Scott-Smith and Baumgartel argue that Slaughter misunderstands the concept of 
network and is somewhat naïve in suggesting that extant global networks, even those 
supportive of a US-led world order, will readily comply with America’s ambitions. 
The Obama administration’s change agenda, then, falls foul of its deeper attachments 
to American preponderance and desire to perpetuate the “American century”.  
The United States, according to the articles in this special issue is neither post-racial 
nor post-imperial nor post-religious/evangelical in pursuit of its self-proclaimed 
historic mission. Even more, there are deep-seated and long-term processes that will, 
it is claimed, thwart an ambitious change agenda. The Obama administration, 
according to the articles in this issue, is proving more continuous with the past than 





     
 
